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Hans
Günter Brauch (Ed.)
Verification
and Arms Control
Implications for European Security
Part II: Selected Papers
[Verifikation
und Rüstungskontrolle.
Implikationen für die Europäische Sicherheit
Teil II: Ausgewählte Papiere]
AFES-PRESS
Report No. 36
1990, 214 pp. ISBN 3-926979-29-1
€ 20.00 - $ 24.00 - SF 40.00
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This volume
is organised in six parts: In part I, Serge Sur (France, then
deputy director of UNIDIR in Geneva) discusses the legal aspects
of verification. In part II, Betty Lall (New York) analyses
the INF verification regime, Michail Kokoev (Moscow) discusses
a proposal for verifying tactical nuclear weaons reduction
and their eventual elimination, Martin Kalinowski (Darmstadt)
reviews the nuclear weapons uses of Tritium and multilateral
control measures, Helena Tuomi (Tampere) analyses new types
of nuclear commerce and verification of non-proliferation,
while Thomas B. Cochrane and Robert Norris (Washington) discussed
approaches for verifying a Nuclear Test Ban with regard to
the technical requirements and national security implications
of lower thresholds.
In part
III on verification and conventional arms control agreements,
Henny J. van der Graaf (Amsterdam) focuses on the prospects
and possible outcome of the conventional arms negotiations
(CSBMs/ CFE), James Mackintosh (Ottawa) reviews the evolution
of verification provisions in the MBFR, CCS BMDE and CFE treaties,
Ole Haesken (Oslo) refers to verification efforts of naval
forces, while Christian Drewniok (Hamburg) offers observations
for the verification of conventional forces form air and from
outer space, Leonie Dreschler-Fischer, Christian Drewniok
and Harald Lange (Hamburg) present computer aided image interpretation
as a tool for verification, and Michael Krepon (Washington)
addresses open skies, production monitoring and the CFE negotiations.
The missing link.
In part
IV Nikita Smidovich (Foreign Ministry, Moscow) discusses several
principles and procedures for the verification of a CW convention,
while the chemist Jiri Matousek (Brno, CSFR) analyses the
verification of the destruction of stockpiles and of production
facilities under the projected chemical weapons convention.
In part V Kurt Gottfried (physicist, Cornell Univ., USA) offers
ideas for cooperative verification institutions and their
political implications, while Bhupendra Jasani (Stockholm/London)
reviews the prospects for a European verification agency.
In part VI on verification and stability Czeslaw Mesjasz (Cracow)
discusses problems of verification and perceptual distortions
in game modelling of international conflicts, Jürgen
Scheffran (Darmstadt) analyses the strategic impact of uncertainty
and perceptions, while Andrei Piontkowsky and A. Skorokhodov
(Moscow) interpret stability and a multilevel problem. The
volume concludes with a selected bibliography of recent writings
on verification and arms control.
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